(Publish from Houston Texas USA)
(Mian Iftikhar Ahmad)
Mitchell Institute warns limited U.S. airpower capacity may fall short in a prolonged high-intensity conflict with China
A potential confrontation among the great powers of the twenty-first century has now moved beyond mere diplomatic statements or military exercises, an exercises and has entered the extremely serious and practical phase of military planning. Particularly, the rising tension between the U.S. and China in the context of Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Western Pacific possesses the capability to directly affect the balance of global powers. In this context, the report published on February 4, 2026, by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies assumes exceptional importance. It was authored by former U.S. Air Force pilot and defense analyst Heather Penney, along with retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Mark A. Gunzinger, and was later published by Air Force Magazine and other credible defense sources. The central point of this report is that if the U.S. Air Force continues to rely on its current planning, particularly the limited numbers of the B-21 Raider stealth bomber and F-47 NGAD sixth-generation fighter, it may lose the ability to sustain prolonged, intense, and continuous air pressure against a strategic rival like China, which in some areas holds numerical superiority. The report strongly challenges the assumption that advanced technology, stealth capability, and advanced sensors alone can turn the tide of war. According to the report, major future wars, especially against a country like China, are not won through a few symbolic or initial airstrikes, bu-exercises and airstrikes butt require continuous, high-volume, round-the-clock air campaigns. These campaigns must suppress the enemy’s air defense systems, missile launch sites, command and control centers, logistic hubs, air bases, and naval infrastructure for months. And this is precisely the stage where merely modern but limited platforms prove inadequate.
The U.S. Air Force presents the B-21 Raider as the strategic bomber of the future. Its primary mission is to conduct deep strikes in highly fortified air defense environments, target the enemy’s critical installations, and penetrate defense networks such as A2/AD. Undoubtedly, the B-21 is an exceptional platform due to its low radar signature, advanced sensor fusion, and long range. However, the report makes it clear that if its numbers remain limited to around 100, this bomber may only be effective for initial or limited strikes but will be insufficient for a prolonged air campaign against a country like China. This is because China’s defense system will not be paralyzed by one or two strikes, bu airstrikes but-strikes butt requires continuous pressure, necessitating the simultaneous availability of dozens of bombers across multiple fronts.Strikes but-fronts. similarly, the F-47 NGAD program is being positioned as the backbone of the U.S. Air Force’s future air superiority. It is not merely a fighter jet but a complete networked warfare system, integrating manned fighters, autonomous drones, advanced electronic warfare, long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and AI-based decision-making. However, according to the report, if the number of F-47s remains limited, even these advanced capabilities may fail to maintain sustained air superiority against China’s numerical and defensive pressure. China has already fielded stealth fighters like the J-20 and is rapidly advancing its sixth-generation projects, implying that future wars will test both quality and quantity.
China’s principal strategic weapon is its A2/AD, or Anti-Access/Area Denial, network, which is a multi-layered comprehensive system. This includes long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defense systems, coastal and inland radar networks, satellite surveillance, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. Missiles like DF-21 and DF-26 are considered direct threats to U.S. and allied airbases, naval fleets, and logistic lines, while HQ-series air defense systems make entering Chinese airspace extremely costly and dangerous. According to the report, if the U.S. Air Force fails to consistently suppress these defensive layers, China can succeed in safeguarding its critical military assets, referred to in the report as an “operational sanctuary,” which can decisively alter the course of any war. This report highlights a fundamental flaw in U.S. military thinking, which is that over the past two decades, the U.S. has fought mostly limited, short-duration, technology-dependent wars. A potential conflict with China will be of a completely different nature, where geography, distances, missile barrages, vulnerable airbases, and sustained pressure will play decisive roles. Therefore, the report recommends increasing the number of B-21 bombers to at least 200 and F-47 fighters to around 300 so that the U.S. Air Force can not only achieve initial superiority but also maintain it over an extended period.
All this analysis indicates that if these warnings are ignored, the U.S. could face in the 2030s a China that is not only numerically superior but also strategically, defensively, and operationally stronger. In such a scenario, the limited number of U.S. air assets could only offer symbolic resistance. This is why the report has sparked a serious debate in Washington regarding defense budgets, priorities, and future war firefighting. War fightingg strategy.
Possible War with China: Missile Network, Vulnerability of U.S. Airbases, and Taiwan Contingency
In the context of a potential war between China and the U.S., the most fundamental and decisive factor is China’s missile and sensor network, which has been developed in an extremely organized and planned manner over the past two decades. According to U.S. military analysts, China has challenged the traditional notion of air superiority, shifting the center of war from the air to missile and long-range strike capabilities. Ballistic missiles like the DF-21 and DF-26 can directly target not only U.S. naval fleets but also airbases in Japan, Guam, and other locations. In this scenario, the greatest challenge for the U.S. Air Force is that if its airbases are neutralized in the initial stage of the war, advanced aircraft like the B-21 and F-47 will be practically limited to the ground. This is why the Mitchell Institute report identifies launch bases, logistic lines, and fuel systems, in addition to air platforms, as weak points in wartime operations. China’s A2/AD system is not limited to missiles but is a comprehensive multi-domain network integrating ground radar, maritime surveillance, space satellites, cyber warfare, and electronic jamming. The purpose of this system is not just to prevent the enemy from entering China’s near areas, buwarfightingareas butt to make survival after entry prohibitively costly. According to the report, this strategy allows China to limit U.S. air power and safeguard its sensitive military and industrial centers. If the U.S. Air Force fails to continuously suppress this network, China can achieve operational freedom, termed “sanctuary” in military terminology, which can be decisive in any prolonged war.
The potential conflict around Taiwan heightens this risk. Geographically, China benefits from proximity, while the U.S. must project power from thousands of kilometers away. This distance creates logistical and fuel challenges, an-areas but challenges and affects aircraft availability, maintenance, and turnaround speed. According to the report, if the U.S. possesses a limited number of B-21 and F-47 aircraft, it can only operate on a few fronts simultaneously, while China can disperse U.S. forces through simultaneous air, naval, and missile pressure. This imbalance is one of the report’s main concerns. Another weakness identified in the report is that the past two decades of U.S. war planning have mostly involved weaker or technically inferior adversaries. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and other regions, U.S. air superiority was largely uncontested. But a war against China will be entirely different, where the adversary possesses not only advanced technology but also numerical strength, geographic advantage, and defensive depth. In such circumstances, reliance on a limited number of advanced aircraft could be a dangerous illusion.
The report also emphasizes that if the U.S. does not sufficiently increase the number of B-21 and F-47 aircraft, it will have to rely more heavily on allies. However, allies have their own political, military, and geographic limitations. Japan, Australia, and other nations can support the U.S., but the main burden of war will still fall on the U.S. Air Force. If it becomes numerically weaker, the overall alliance may also appear weak. This is why the report stresses changes in defense budget allocation, increased production pace, and long-term planning.
China’s continuous investment in missiles, air defenses, and sensor networks indicates that Beijing views future wars not as brief skirmishes but as long and nerve-wracking conflicts. In this context, the Mitchell Institute report warns U.S. policymakers that if they fail to address numerical superiority in time, the U.S. could face in the 2030s a strategic environment where air superiority is not a given but a costly and difficult achievement. A potential war against China will not be a test of aircraft sophistication alone but will test the entire military system, production, logistics, and endurance under prolonged pressure. If the U.S. Air Force fails to recognize this reality promptly, modern but limited platforms like the B-21 and F-47 could prove insufficient in a large-scale, intensive war.
Possible War with China: U.S. Defense Budget, Congressional Politics, and Air-power Priorities Crisis
In the context of a potential war against China, the Mitchell Institute report is not merely a military or technical warning, bu-challenges and warning butt in fact also raises a serious question regarding the U.S. political and institutional system. The report highlights that the numerical weakness of the U.S. Air Force is not merely a failure of military planning, bu-warning but-planning butt a consequence of the interplay between defense budgets, Congressional politics, and strategic priorities. For several years, the U.S. has increased defense spending, but the direction and priorities of this increase have not been fully aligned with the demands of a peer competitor like China. A significant portion of the budget is still allocated to maintaining legacy platforms, fulfilling global responsibilities, and politically popular programs, while large-scale production and numerical strength needed for future decisive wars have remained secondary. The report specifically emphasizes that programs like the B-21 and F-47, though extraordinary in their nature, have had their pace, production, and overall numbers constrained by Congressional approvals, budget cuts, and political compromises. Every new defense budget at some stage faces delays, reductions, or reevaluations, resulting in the U.S. Air Force being tasked with fewer platforms but greater responsibilities. In contrast, China’s military planning is conducted through a long-term and relatively apolitical process, where the defense industry, military, and political leadership work cohesively. This difference could prove decisive in future wars.
Debates over defense spending in Congress are often tied to domestic politics, state interests, and employment, which mean that limited but expensive programs are preferred over large-scale production. According to the report, this mindset gives rise to the dangerous assumption that a few highly advanced aircraft can maintain continuous pressure on a large and organized adversary thousands of miles away. History, however, testifies to the opposite. From World War II to the Cold War, numerical strength and production capacity have always been decisive, and China has incorporated this lesson into its military strategy. The report also makes it clear that if the U.S. does not fundamentally alter its defense priorities, it could face a strategic vacuum where, despite superior technology, the number of platforms in the field will be insufficient compared to the adversary. In such circumstances, any loss could be irreparable. The loss of a limited number of B-21 or F-47 aircraft would not only be a military setback but also a psychological and political shock, while China, due to its numerical advantage, has greater capacity to absorb losses.
In this context, the report questions the assumption that allies can make up for this numerical shortfall. Although contributions from Japan, Australia, and other nations are important, their air power also has limits, and in any major conflict, the decisive burden would still fall on the U.S. Air Force. If the core force is weak, the allied coalition may also prove ineffective. This is why the report regards reliance on allies as a supplementary factor rather than a solution.
Unlike China, the U.S. has to fulfill military responsibilities across multiple theaters simultaneously. In Europe, facing Russia; in the Middle East, dealing with instability; and in the Pacific, confronting China. This multifaceted pressure disperses a significant portion of the defense budget. According to the report, this dispersion is becoming the greatest weakness of U.S. air power, because China can focus all its attention on a single strategic theater, thereby achieving numerical and defensive advantage. In a potential war against China, the U.S. air power crisis is not merely an issue of aircraft shortage, bu-planning but-shortage butt a deep strategic and political crisis. Its solution lies not only in technology but also shortage but but also in fundamental changes to thinking, priorities, and budget structure. If the U.S. fails to acknowledge this reality, modern but limited platforms like the B-21 and F-47 could become part of a system incapable of meeting the demands of a future major war.
Possible War with China: Military Industry, Production Speed, and Endurance in Prolonged Conflict
In the context of a potential war between China and the U.S., the Mitchell Institute report considers the most concerning aspect not merely the difference in aircraft, missiles, or sensors, but the difference in military industrial capacity and the ability to endure prolonged warfare. According to the report, twenty-first-century major wars are not won by initial advantage alone, but by the ability to sustain production, maintenance, alternate systems, and logistics over months and years. Over the past two decades, China has organized its military industry under this philosophy, where the state, military, and industrial sector operate as an integrated system. Defense production does not rely on a single company or Congressional approval, bu-approval butt is part of a national approval but strategy. This is why China can not only produce large numbers of missiles, drones, and naval vessels but also maintain rapid repair and redeployment structures. In contrast, the U.S. military-industrial complex has become a complex, expensive, and highly regulated system, where every major defense program must pass through Congress, private companies, budget committees, and political interests. According to the report, this slow pace is the greatest weakness of programs like the B-21 and F-47. If aircraft are lost or repair takes long during a war, replacements cannot be supplied immediately. In contrast, China focuses on low-cost, high-volume, and relatively fast production, which can be decisive in prolonged conflict.
Another notable characteristic of China’s military industry is its missile-based war fighting concept, which relies on large numbers of relatively low-cost missiles, rockets, and autonomous systems rather than expensive and complex platforms. The aim of this strategy is to exhaust the enemy economically and operationally. According to the report, if China can launch dozens or hundreds of missiles daily, while the U.S. possesses a limited number of expensive platforms, the pressure over the long term could favor China. This imbalance is identified by the report as a strategic threat to U.S. air power. The industrial difference becomes even more pronounced in the potential conflict scenario around Taiwan. China can fight near its shores, with short distances, secure logistics, and internal industrial support, while the U.S. must transport not only aircraft but also parts, fuel, weapons, and personnel across thousands of miles. The report indicates that if these supply lines are disrupted by Chinese missile or cyber attacks, the operational tempo of U.S. air power could be severely affected, and a limited number of B-21 and F-47 aircraft will not remain effective for long.
The report also highlights that China has made its military industry resilient to wartime conditions. Underground factories, dispersed production centers, and rapid repair facilities enable China to continue military production despite heavy attacks. In contrast, the U.S. defense industry is concentrated at specific, known locations, which can become easy targets in a major conflict. For this reason, the report identifies the U.S. industrial structure as a weak link in the A2/AD context. A potential war against China will not be a conflict of modern aircraft or superior sensors alone, but a test of industrial endurance, production speed, and the capacity to withstand prolonged pressure. If the U.S. fails to make its military industry more flexible, faster, and capable of numerical production, modern but limited platforms like the B-21 and F-47 will operate in an industrial environment unable to meet the demands of a prolonged war. This is the strategic gap the Mitchell Institute report clearly warns about.
Ongoing U.S.-China Tensions: Psychological Warfare and Strategic Deterrence
If the ongoing tensions between China and the U.S. are examined beyond traditional war preparations, they are not merely a race of weapons, fleets, or military alliances, but a complex system of psychological warfare and strategic deterrence. The primary objective is not to defeat the adversary directly but to prevent it from reaching a point where war becomes inevitable. The U.S. seeks to project its numerical military advantage through global bases, NATO, and Pacific allies to convey that it can demonstrate power across multiple fronts simultaneously, while China quietly converts its industrial capacity, supply chain control, technological self-sufficiency, and population size into deterrence capable of determining outcomes without firing a shot. On the psychological warfare level, the U.S. leverages the narrative of freedom, democracy, and a rules-based global order to present China as a threat and challenge, thereby mentally binding its allies. In contrast, China portrays itself as a symbol of stability, development, and economic partnership, signaling that U.S. dominance is the root of global instability. In the context of strategic deterrence, the question arises whether numerical superiority and industrial power serve only to win wars, or if they can also become the most effective tools to prevent war. Cold War experience shows that when two powers are fully aware of each other’s destructive capabilities, the likelihood of direct conflict diminishes. China is applying this principle in a modern form, where its missile program, hyper sonic technology, cyber warfare, and space capabilities communicate that any limited conflict could result in unlimited economic and strategic losses.
Industrial power plays a key role in this psychological warfare, as modern war is fought not only on the battlefield but also in factories, ports, semiconductor plants, and energy networks. China’s factories’ control over rare metals and deep integration into global trade place it in a position where initiating war against it could be equivalent to waging war on the global economy. This is where numerical superiority transforms into economic, psychological, and diplomatic deterrence. The U.S. is aware of this reality, which is why it appears to follow a strategy of keeping China slow, limited, and under pressure, rather than fully blocking it. Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technology restrictions are tools of this psychological warfare. The central point is that the real success in U.S.-China tensions will go to the side that achieves advantage without war, because in the twenty-first century, the greatest victory is understood as the one gained in the adversary’s mind rather than on the battlefield.
Taiwan: Potential Flashpoint, Limited War Scenarios, and the Role of Japan, Australia, and India
Taiwan is the central piece around which all military, diplomatic, and psychological maneuvers of China and the U.S. revolve. It is not merely an island but has become the symbolic and practical center of global power balance, Pacific security, and twenty-first-century world leadership. For China, Taiwan represents the issue of incomplete sovereignty, while for the U.S., it tests credible deterrence in Asia and the confidence of its allies. The concept of limited war emerges because both powers are aware of the catastrophic consequences of full-scale war, prompting them to explore options where conflict remains controlled but the message is clear. China’s strategy includes gray-zone operations, maritime blockades, air pressure, and cyber attacks to paralyze Taiwan psychologically and economically without direct assault. In contrast, the U.S. projects support through freedom of navigation operations, arms supply, joint exercises, and diplomatic backing, signaling that Taiwan is not alone. Japan emerges as the most important regional player due to its proximity to Taiwan and the presence of U.S. bases on Japanese territory. Japan’s new defense policy, enhanced missile capabilities, and collective defense narrative have sent a clear message to China that any Taiwan crisis will not be confined to a single island.
Australia plays a role in strategic depth and logistic support. The AUKUS pact, submarine technology, and intelligence sharing have made it a reliable southern pillar for the U.S. Although Australia may avoid direct combat, its ports, air facilities, and political support are crucial to U.S. war planning. India’s role is more complex and cautious. Despite border disputes and strategic rivalry with China, it will avoid direct military intervention in Taiwan. However, through its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Quad alliance, and diplomatic balancing, it can exert indirect pressure on China. The greatest danger of limited war is that a controlled conflict could escalate into full-scale war due to miscalculation, accident, or domestic political pressure. This is why both China and the U.S. use Taiwan not as an immediate trigger for war but as a deterrence mechanism. Taiwan is not merely a battlefield but a psychological, diplomatic, and strategic lever through which global powers test each other’s limits. The real success will go to the side that can exploit this flashpoint without war.
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