Mian Iftikhar Ahmad
The nation witnesses the passage of the Twenty-Seventh Constitutional Amendment with a two-thirds majority, yet alongside this approval arises a debate over whether this amendment was enacted to strengthen institutional balance or to prevent a specific political leader from gaining influence in the future. On the surface, the amendment aims to redefine the balance of power among the judiciary, the establishment, and Parliament, but the timing, circumstances, and political context suggest that the law is not solely driven by constitutional necessity, but also by political considerations. At a time when Imran Khan is entangled in multiple legal cases, his party PTI is weakened in Parliament, and the former ruling alliance has openly criticized the judiciary, the introduction of this amendment appears to be a deliberate and calculated step rather than mere coincidence. Historically, Imran Khan leveraged the establishment to secure power, challenged Nawaz Sharif and his allies through legal proceedings, won elections via the RTS system, and once in office, influenced decisions to his advantage. However, when the establishment turned against him, he faced imprisonment, court cases, and legal restrictions. This backdrop created a realization among the state institutions that any individual with popular support and institutional leverage could dominate the system, which seems to be the underlying concern shaping the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
The amendment introduces several key elements, including the establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court, modifications to judicial appointment procedures, the redistribution of Supreme Court powers, and a unified command structure within the defense framework. Collectively, these provisions are designed to prevent any individual from unilaterally altering the balance of power across the judiciary, military, or other institutions. The government maintains that the amendment was intended to enhance institutional balance and judicial transparency, yet critics argue that it is essentially a constitutional barrier aimed at preventing leaders like Imran Khan from challenging the establishment again. Legally, the amendment does not mention any individual or party, so formally it cannot be said to target anyone specifically. However, Pakistan’s political history demonstrates that constitutional amendments have often followed shifts in power dynamics. For instance, General Zia’s 58(2)(b) gave the president the power to dissolve assemblies, Nawaz Sharif’s 13th Amendment removed that power, and the 18th Amendment during Zardari’s tenure increased provincial autonomy. In this sequence, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is presented as a constitutional safeguard for state institutions. Although government representatives describe it as a path to stability, the opposition sees it as a political barrier preventing any leader from leveraging public support to challenge institutions. While the amendment may temporarily stabilize the balance of power, in the long term it could deepen political distrust and widen institutional divides. The perception that political forces are using the constitution to limit their rivals affects the credibility of constitutional institutions. For this reason, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is regarded not merely as a constitutional reform but as a politically motivated measure, ostensibly framed as institutional reform to block potential threats. While there is no direct evidence that this step was taken solely to target Imran Khan, circumstantial indicators, timing, and context suggest that the law was enacted to prevent any individual from reshaping the state according to personal ambitions. In essence, the amendment seeks to preserve the system under the guise of constitutional safeguards while simultaneously erecting a barrier against future political upheavals, the effectiveness of which will ultimately be judged by time and public awareness.
